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NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF A DoG-LEAsH ORDINANCE AS A BASIS FOR NEGLIGENCE-Defendant, in violation of a city ordinance requiring every owner or
custodian of a dog to keep the animal on his own premises unless on a leash and
under control of a competent person,1 allowed his dog to run loose on the street.

1 Los Angeles Mun. Code, Art. 3, §53.06.2 as amended by Ordinance No. 88853 of
the City of Los Angeles, Cal., approved Nov. 9, 1944, states: "Every person owning or
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On collision of the dog with plaintiff's motor scooter, plaintiff brought suit for
injuries incurred, claiming negligence per se by defendant through violation of
the ordinance. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer. On appeal, held,
reversed. The violation of the ordinance was negligence per se, since the purpose
of the ordinance included the protection of people in traffic against the dangers
that dogs may cause running loose. Brotemarkle v. Snyder, (Cal. App. 1950)
221 P. (2d) 992.
At common law the dog is placed in a preferred position, no liability being
imposed upon an owner for damages caused by a dog left unattended upon a
highway unless he ought to have known that the dog was dangerous.2 Statutes
and ordinances changing this rule are of two general types. One places civil
liability upon an owner for damages caused by his dog, thus eliminating any
need for a claimant to show knowledge or negligence on the part of the owner.3
The other is penal in nature, and in order to predicate civil liability one must
show that (I) he was of the class of persons intended to be protected and (2)
that the ordinance or statute was meant to guard against the particular hazard
from which his injury resulted.4 It seems clear that if a person was bitten by a
dog while walking on the sidewalk he would satisfy these requirements; 5 probably being run down by a large dog would be sufficient also.6 However, the
courts have been reluctant to find civil liability where the injury has been
caused by the traffic hazard resulting from the violation of the penal type provisions. The courts have found either a failure to meet the aforementioned requirements7 or a lack of proximate cause.8 It is submitted that the latter finding
omits a consideration of the real issue: whether there is any negligence present
due to the violation of the statute. By holding that the injury is not caused by
the breach of the ordinance, these courts in effect are finding that the statute was
having charge, care, custody or control of any dog shall keep such dog exclusively upon
his own premises; provided, however, that such dog may be off such premises if it be under
the control of a competent person and restrained by a substantial chain or leash not exceeding six feet in length."
l R.C.L. 1095; PROSSER, TORTS §57 (1941).
Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N.E. 192 (1913); Silverglade v. Von
Rohr, 107 Ohio St. 75, 140 N.E. 669 (1923); Tasker v. Arey, 114 Me. 551, 96 A. 737
(1916); Malafronte v. Miloni, 35 R.I. 225, 86 A. 146 (1913). See annotations in I
A.L.R. 1113 and 142 A.L.R. 436.
4 PROSSER, ToRTS §39 (1941); ToRTS RBsTATBMBNT §286. California is a jurisdiction in which violation of either a statute or an ordinance may be negligence per se.
Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418 (1880); Fenn v. Clark, 11 Cal. App. 79, 103 P. 944 (1909);
-Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. (2d) 581, 177 P. (2d) 279 (1947).
For views taken by other jurisdictions see PROSSER, ToRTS §39 (1941).
5Wistafka v. Grotowski, 205 ill. App. 529 (1917).
6 Eigner v. Race, 54 Cal. App. 506, 129 P. (2d) 444 (1942).
7 Canavan v. George, 292 Mass. 245, 198 N.E. 270 (1935); Brown v. Moyer, 186
Iowa 1322, 171 N.W. 297 (1919). Query if the correct analysis is made in the cases which
deny recovery because the plaintiff is not a member of the class meant to be protected.
Suppose he were bitten by a dog while riding on a motorcycle, what result then?
s Nepsha v. Wozniak, (Ind. App. 1950) 92 N.E. (2d) 734.
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not directed against the type of hazard involved.9 In the principal case the court
used the negligence approach and found a broader purpose of the ordinance to
prevent not only dog-bites and similar injuries, but also the injuries resulting
from traffic hazards caused by loose dogs. This holding seems to be a new development in the interpretation of the dog-leash ordinances, but it is submitted that
it is justified. In the case of large domestic animals, a similar view is quite generally accepted,10 and at least one jurisdiction has indicated that a like view would
be adopted in the case of dogs. 11 In the light of present day transportation and
the speeds at which vehicles move on our streets and highways, it seems reasonable to find that one purpose of dog-leash legislation is to eliminate the canine
traffic hazard.12
John J. Edman, S. Ed.

9PnossEn, TonTs §39 (1941).
v. Colclough, 81 Mich. 624, 45 N.W. 1106 (1890); Jewett v. Gage, 55
Me. 538 (1868); Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926). Courts
seem quite willing to find as a purpose of these statutes the protection of traffic against
cattle, sheep, horses and hogs, but are reluctant to say that they are meant to protect against
personal injuries by these animals. Decker v. McSorely, 111 Wis. 91, 86 N.W. 554
(1901) (horse kicked a child); Putermann v. Simon, 127 Mo. App. 511, 105 S.W. 1098
(1907) (horse bit the plaintiff).
11 Cincinnati N.O. and T.P. R. Co. v. Ford, 139 Tenn. 291, 202 S.W. 72 (1918);
Stagner v. Craig, 159 Tenn. 511, 19 S.W. (2d) 234 (1929). Both of these suits were
brought by the owner of a dog which was killed in a collision with the defendants' train
and automobile respectively. In both cases the defendant successfully pleaded contributory
negligence upon the part of the plaintiff on the grounds that the dog was running loose
contrary to statute.
12 In the principal case the plaintiff cited a report by.the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, Report No. 100 MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF DoGs (1943), which points
out the many dangers that loose dogs may cause, including that of being a traffic hazard.
10 Shipley

